COVID-19’s Patient Zero was a woman working at China’s Wuhan animal market, not an accountant unconnected to the facility, as previously concluded by the World Health Organisation, writes MedicalBrief. In a Science analysis, leading United States virologist Richard Worobey reverses his support for the thesis that the virus leaked from a Wuhan laboratory.
The accountant, previously thought to be the first person with COVID-19, reported that his first symptoms appeared on 16 December, several days later than initially known, said Worobey, head of ecology and evolutionary biology at the University of Arizona. For Worobey, that information and his analysis of other early cases of COVID-19 in the city tipped the scales towards the virus having originated in an animal.
The origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus that causes COVID-19 remains a mystery and a major source of tension between China and the United States, writes Reuters. A joint study by China and the WHO this year all but ruled out the theory that COVID-19 originated in a laboratory, saying that the most likely hypothesis was that it infected humans naturally, probably via the wildlife trade.
A WHO-led team of experts spent four weeks in and around Wuhan with Chinese scientists and said in a joint report in March that the SARS-CoV-2 virus had probably been transmitted from bats to humans through another animal but that further research was needed.
A criticism of the market theory was that because health authorities raised the alert about cases of a suspicious disease linked to the market as early as 30 December 2019, that would have introduced a bias that led to the identification of more cases there than elsewhere, since attention had already been drawn to it, writes CBS News.
To counter that argument, Worobey analysed cases reported by two hospitals before the alert was raised. Those cases were also largely linked to the market, and those which were not were nevertheless geographically concentrated around it.
“In this city of 11 million people, half of the early cases are linked to a place that's the size of a soccer field,” said Worobey. “It becomes very difficult to explain that pattern if the outbreak didn't start at the market.”
Another criticism of the theory was based on the fact that the first case identified was unrelated to the market. But while the WHO report claimed the man originally identified as patient zero had been ill from 8 December, he actually was not sick until 16 December, according to Worobey.
That deduction was based on a video interview he found, from a case described in a scientific article and from a hospital medical record that matched the 41-year-old man. That would mean the first reported case would be the woman who worked in the market, who fell ill on 11 December.
Peter Daszak, a disease expert who was on the WHO investigation team, said he was convinced by Worobey's analysis. “That December 8 date was a mistake,” CBS quotes him as saying.
The New York Times reports that several experts, including one of the pandemic investigators chosen by the WHO, said that Worobey’s detective work was “sound” and that the first known case of Covid was most likely a seafood vendor.
But some of them also said the evidence was still insufficient to decisively settle the larger question of how the pandemic began. They suggested that the virus probably infected a “patient zero” sometime before the vendor’s case and then reached critical mass to spread widely at the market. Studies of changes in the virus’s genome — including one done by Worobey — have suggested that the first infection happened in roughly mid-November 2019, weeks before the vendor got sick.
“I don’t disagree with the analysis,” said Jesse Bloom, a virologist at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center. “But I don’t agree that any of the data are strong enough or complete enough to say anything very confidently, other than that the Huanan Seafood Market was clearly a super-spreading event.” Bloom also noted that this was not the first time the WHO report, done in collaboration with Chinese researchers, was found to contain mistakes, including errors involving early patients’ potential links to the market.
Elucidating the origin of the pandemic requires understanding of the Wuhan outbreak
Published in Science on 18 November 2021
Some key questions lie at the heart of investigations into the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. It now clear live mammals susceptible to coronaviruses, including raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides), were sold at Huanan Market and three other live-animal markets in Wuhan before the pandemic. Severe acute respiratory syndrome–related coronaviruses (SARSr-CoVs) were found in dogs during the SARS outbreak, facilitated by animal-to-human contact in live-animal markets. However, because of the early public health focus on Huanan Market, it remains unclear whether the apparent preponderance of hospitalised COVID-19 cases associated with this market was truly reflective of the initial outbreak.
Answering these questions requires resolving several crucial events in December 2019 and early January 2020.
On 30 December 2019, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission (WHC) issued two emergency notices to local hospitals alerting them to patients with unexplained pneumonia—several of whom worked at Huanan Market—and laying out a treatment and response plan.
The first official public report was WHC’s announcement the next day that they had carried out case searches and investigations related to Huanan Market and found 27 patients. Forty-one formed the basis of an influential study that reported that 66%—i.e., not all early cases—were linked to Huanan Market.
They had been transferred between 29 December and 2 January from other hospitals to Jinyintan Hospital, Wuhan’s premier infectious disease centre. Notably, individuals were enrolled according to clinical presentation, not epidemiologic information, such as connections to Huanan Market.
China’s Viral Pneumonia of Unknown Etiology (VPUE) mechanism was established in the wake of SARS as an early warning reporting system for detecting unknown viral diseases, overseen by the China Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC). PUE cases are supposed to be reported by clinicians to the national notifiable disease reporting system through an internet-based platform. Evidently, that did not happen in Wuhan in December.
The system appears to have been in active use only from 3 January. Although it favoured cases having a connection to Huanan Market, the VPUE mechanism could not have improperly inflated the proportion of Huanan Market–linked cases in December. Moreover, reporting began only after the 41 patients were transferred from other hospitals to Jinyintan Hospital.
Nevertheless, it is possible that a disproportionate number of cases linked to Huanan Market were transferred to Jinyintan Hospital because of public health officials’ early focus there.
It should be considered, however, what happened in the hospitals that first pieced together the new viral outbreak. Media reports reveal that Hubei Provincial Hospital of Integrated Chinese and Western Medicine (HPHICWM) was the first to alert district, municipal, and provincial public health authorities about the mysterious pneumonia cases. Zhang Jixian, director of respiratory and critical care medicine, noticed on 27 December that an elderly couple had large “ground glass” opacities in computed tomography (CT) images of their lungs, distinct from those she had seen in other viral pneumonia cases.
Zhang insisted that the couple’s son, who was not a patient and had no symptoms, undergo a CT scan. The same unusual lesions were observed. The husband and wife evidently are “cluster 1” in the World Health Organization (WHO)–China report: They are the earliest known case cluster and the only cluster admitted by 26 December. They had no known connection to Huanan Market.
Another patient with similar CT imaging, a worker at Huanan Market, was admitted on 27 December. Zhang, concerned about a new, probably infectious viral disease, reported the four cases to hospital officials, who alerted the Jianghan District CDC that day. Over 28/29 December, three more patients, all of whom worked at Huanan Market, were admitted with the same unknown respiratory disease.
A vice president of HPHICWM, Xia Wenguang, brought together 10 experts from the hospital, including Zhang, for an emergency meeting on 29 December, and they concluded the situation was extraordinary. Upon learning of similar patients, also linked to Huanan Market, at Tongji and Union (Xiehe) Hospitals, Xia alerted the Wuhan and Hubei CDCs on 29 December.
A similar situation unfolded at Wuhan Central Hospital. On 18 December, Ai Fen, director of the emergency department, encountered an unexplained pneumonia patient, a 65-year-old man who had become ill on either 13 or 15 December. Unbeknown to Ai, he was a deliveryman at Huanan Market. A CT scan revealed infection in both lungs, and he did not respond to antibiotics or anti-influenza drugs. On 24 December, a bronchoalveolar lavage specimen collected from him was sent to Vision Medicals, a metagenomics sequencing company.
They identified a new SARSr-CoV on 26 December and phoned the finding to the hospital on 27 December. By 28 December, Wuhan Central Hospital had identified seven cases, four linked to Huanan Market. These seven cases, like those at HPHICWM, were ascertained before epidemiologic investigations concerning Huanan Market began on 29 December.
At Zhongnan Hospital in the Wuchang District of Wuhan, 15km away from Huanan Market, Vice President Yuan Yufeng asked units on 31 December to search for unexplained pneumonia cases, and the Respiratory Medicine Department reported two. The first lived in Wuchang District but worked at Huanan Market (in Jianghan District). The second did not work at Huanan Market but had friends who did and who had visited him.
On 3 January, three more cases were identified—a family cluster unlinked to Huanan Market. Clearly, hospitals in the first weeks of the outbreak were identifying cases both with and without a known connection to Huanan Market. And Wuhan hospitals were not swamped with unexplained pneumonia cases at the end of December. That came later.
Thus, 10 of these hospitals’ 19 earliest COVID-19 cases were linked to Huanan Market (~53%), comparable both to Jinyintan’s 66% (of 41 cases) and to the WHO-China report’s 33% of 168 retrospectively identified cases across December 2019. Regarding cases at the Wuhan Central Hospital and HPHICWM, patients with a history of exposure at Huanan Market could not have been “cherry picked” before anyone had identified the market as an epidemiologic risk factor. Hence, there was a genuine preponderance of early COVID-19 cases associated with Huanan Market.
How can this knowledge inform our understanding of the pandemic? If Huanan Market were the source, why were only one- to two-thirds of early cases linked to the market? Perhaps a better question is why would one expect all cases ascertained weeks into the outbreak to be confined to one market?
Given the high transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 and the high rate of asymptomatic spread, many symptomatic cases would inevitably soon lack a direct link to the location of the pandemic’s origin. And some cases counted as “unlinked” may have been only one or two transmissions away, as exemplified by the second patient identified at Zhongnan Hospital. That so many of the >100 COVID-19 cases from December with no identified epidemiologic link to Huanan Market nonetheless lived in its direct vicinity is notable and provides compelling evidence that community transmission started at the market.
Additionally, the earliest known cases should not necessarily be expected to be the first infected or linked to Huanan Market: They probably postdated the outbreak’s index case by a considerable period because only ~7% of SARS-CoV-2 infections lead to hospitalisation; most fly under the radar. Similarly, it is entirely expected that early, ascertained cases from a seafood market would be workers who were not necessarily directly associated with wildlife sales because the outbreak spread from human to human.
The index case was most likely one of the ~93% who never required hospitalisation and indeed could have been any of hundreds of workers who had even brief contact with infected live mammals.
Crucially, however, the now famous “earliest” COVID-19 case, a 41-year-old male accountant, who lived 30km south of Huanan Market and had no connection to it—illness onset reported as 8 December—appears to have become ill with COVID-19 considerably later. When interviewed, he reported that his COVID-19 symptoms started with a fever on 16 December; the 8 December illness was a dental problem related to baby teeth retained into adulthood.
This is corroborated by hospital records and a scientific paper that reports his COVID-19 onset date as 16 December, and hospitalisation date as 22 December. This indicates he was infected through community transmission after the virus had begun spreading from Huanan Market. He believed he may have been infected in a hospital (presumably during his dental emergency) or on the subway during his commute; he had also travelled north of Huanan Market shortly before his symptoms began.
His symptom onset came after multiple cases in workers at Huanan Market, making a female seafood vendor there the earliest known case, with illness onset 11 December. Notably, she reported knowledge of several possible COVID-19 cases in clinics and hospitals near Huanan Market from 11 December, and Huanan Market patients were hospitalised at Union Hospital as early as 10 December.
Although a widely cited report credits the VPUE mechanism with uncovering the pandemic, it was HPHICWM that identified both the outbreak and the Huanan Market connection and passed on these fully formed discoveries to district, municipal, and provincial public health officials by 29 December. National officials reportedly did not learn about the outbreak until CCDC Director George Gao encountered online group chats about the WHC emergency notices on the evening of 30 December. Concerned that so many cases had not been reported to the VPUE system, he quickly notified the National Health Commission.
Therefore, the preponderance of early cases connected to Huanan Market could not have been an artifact of ascertainment bias introduced by case definitions in the VPUE system. Although mechanisms like China’s VPUE system are potentially invaluable, they will fail without both widespread buy-in from health care providers and rapid data sharing from local to central authorities. Key problems with the VPUE system were known before the pandemic, including that most clinicians in China had little awareness of the VPUE system and were not reporting cases to it—for example, 0 of 335 PUE cases in one study from 2019.
China should be commended, however, for having such a system, which is lacking in most countries. The focus now should be on fixing the problems that COVID-19 has exposed and blanketing the globe with a highly functional PUE early warning system.
Samples from the earliest COVID-19 patients in Wuhan have been sequenced, and two distinct SARS-CoV-2 lineages, A and B, have been identified. Given that the elderly couple at HPHICWM was the WHO report’s cluster 1, it follows that the husband, illness onset 26 December, must be the source of the earliest lineage A sequence, Wuhan/IME-WH01/2019 (GenBank accession number MT291826), which he most likely got from his wife, who became ill on 15 December.
This raises the possibility that the Yangchahu market that they visited may have been a site of a separate animal spillover. The recent discovery that there may be no true lineage A or B intermediates in humans also raises the possibility of separate spillovers of both lineages. However, the earliest known lineage A genomes have close geographical connections to Huanan Market: one from a patient who stayed in a hotel near Huanan Market in the days before illness onset in December and the other from the 62-year-old husband in cluster 1 who visited Yangchahu Market, a few blocks north of Huanan Market and lived just to the south.
Therefore, if lineage A had a separate animal origin from lineage B, both most likely occurred at Huanan Market, and the association with Yangchahu Market, which does not appear to have sold live mammals, may be due to community transmission starting in the neighbourhoods surrounding Huanan Market.
With SARS, live-animal markets continued to sell infected animals for many months, allowing zoonotic spillover to be established as the origin and revealing multiple independent jumps from animals into humans. Unfortunately, no live mammal collected at Huanan Market or any other live-animal market in Wuhan has been screened for SARS-CoV-2–related viruses, and Huanan Market was closed and disinfected on 1 January 2020.
Nevertheless, that most early symptomatic cases were linked to Huanan Market, specifically to the western section where raccoon dogs were caged, provides strong evidence of a live-animal market origin of the pandemic.
This would explain the extraordinary preponderance of early COVID-19 cases at one of the handful of sites in Wuhan (population 11m) that sell some of the same animals that brought us SARS. Although it may never be possible to recover related viruses from animals if they were not sampled at the time of emergence, conclusive evidence of a Huanan Market origin from infected wildlife may nonetheless be obtainable through analysis of spatial patterns of early cases and from additional genomic data, including SARS-CoV-2–positive samples from Huanan Market, as well as through integration of additional epidemiologic data.
Preventing future pandemics depends on this effort.
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